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Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act provides a cause of action based on false advertising when, "in commercial advertising or promotion, [the defendant] misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities." 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)(B). In Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered whether such a cause of action exists when a party falsely claims that a feature of its product is patented. See, No. 2022-2160, 2024 WL 4376134, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2024). The court found that it does.
In particular, the website of counterclaim-defendant Crocs, Inc. (Crocs) was alleged to have falsely described "Croslite" material used in Crocs footwear products as "patented," "proprietary," and "exclusive." Id. at *1. Crocs moved for summary judgment, arguing that this claim was "legally barred" by two prior decisions, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), and Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The district court agreed and granted Crocs's motion, holding that "the terms 'patented,' 'proprietary,' and 'exclusive' were claims of 'inventorship'" akin to a "false designation of authorship" (as in Dastar and Molten), not misrepresentations as to "the nature, characteristics, or qualities of Crocs' products" (as required by the Lanham Act). See, id.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. In doing so, the court characterized the holdings of Dastar (where the Supreme Court addressed misrepresentations as to the authorship of a video) and Baden (where the Federal Circuit considered misrepresentations claiming the defendant was the "innovator, i.e., the author" of certain technology) to be "informative" but not controlling. Id. at *5. Dastar and Molten were distinguishable because "[a] claim that a product is constructed of 'patented' material is not solely an expression of innovation and, hence, authorship." Id. Instead, the Crocs website included statements both "that a patent covers Croslite" and "that Croslite has numerous tangible benefits found in all of Crocs' shoe products," which were "directed to the nature, characteristics, or qualities of Crocs' shoes." Id. Because the complaint "presented a theory under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act linking Crocs' alleged misrepresentations in commercial advertisements to the nature, characteristics, or qualities of Crocs' shoes," the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the false advertising claims. See, id.
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