Law.com Subscribers SAVE 30%
Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
D.C. Circuit Court Rules That Artificial Intelligence Cannot Solely Author Copyrightable Works
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently affirmed that artificial intelligence (AI) cannot be the sole author on a copyright-registered work, but questions still remain as to the future of AI authorship.
In a March 18, 2025 decision, the court held that the Copyright Act of 1976 precludes AI from being the sole author of a federally copyrighted work but left questions about the future of AI authorship in copyright for Congress to resolve.
How Did We Get Here?
In the mid-1990s, Dr. Stephen Thaler invented a generative AI tool called the Creativity Machine. Not only has the AI tool been patented (in a now-expired U.S. Patent No. 5,689,666), but Dr. Thaler attempted to expand the AI’s intellectual property rights by using it to create an image, “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.”
When Dr. Thaler applied to federally register the work, he listed the Creativity Machine as the sole author, while he was the sole claimant/owner. He further characterized the role of the Creativity Machine by noting that the work was “[c]reated autonomously by machine” in the application.
The Copyright Office denied the application, citing its long-standing regulation that a human being must create a work for it to be eligible for federal copyright registration, and Dr. Thaler appealed, citing constitutional, statutory, and policy arguments.
Creative Arguments Before the Court
The Copyright Office rooted its human-authorship requirement in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 8.). The court reminded Dr. Thaler that constitutional intellectual property protections exist not to protect authors, but to benefit the public, by encouraging the creation of art; prohibiting sole AI authorship does not impede these protections or benefits.
Dr. Thaler tried two alternative arguments. First, under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, Dr. Thaler argued that he should be the author and owner of the work authored by the AI tool, trying to compare it to instances where entities who are non-human, artificial persons immediately gain authorship of a work under this doctrine by hiring the author. While the U.S. Copyright Office rejected this argument due to a lack of a contract between Dr. Thaler and the Creativity Machine, and the district court rejected it due to a lack of conveyable interest given the ineligibility for copyright registration, the Circuit Court went a step further: under this doctrine, a non-human entity is merely considered to be the author but does not become the author itself, preserving the requirement that a work-made-for-hire, like other copyrightable works, must first be created by a human author.
Second, Dr. Thaler asserted, for the first time at the district court, that the work was copyrightable because he provided instructions and directed the AI. This was rejected given Dr. Thaler’s previous representations about the Creativity Machine’s autonomous generation.
This premium content is locked for Entertainment Law & Finance subscribers only
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
- Stay current on the latest information, rulings, regulations, and trends
- Includes practical, must-have information on copyrights, royalties, AI, and more
- Tap into expert guidance from top entertainment lawyers and experts
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 Opt In
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Legal Possession: What Does It Mean?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
The Stranger to the Deed Rule
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.