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S. Ct. Authorizes Disparate Impact Age Discrimination Claims
The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued an important decision concerning the Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In Smith v. Jackson, Miss., the Court held that employees aged 40 and over can assert claims for age discrimination under the ADEA based on the disparate impact of a facially neutral employment policy, even in the absence of discriminatory intent on the employers' part. In so doing, the Court reconciled a split in the federal circuit courts of appeal and aligned its view concerning the scope of the ADEA with its view of the scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, according to prior Court decisions, permits employees to allege discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex and national origin based on the disparate impact of a facially neutral employment policy. An increase in the amount of litigation in respect to these types of claims under the ADEA will likely result from the Smith opinion.
Statutory Background
The ADEA, enacted in 1967, makes it unlawful for employers to “limit, segregate, or classify [their] employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age …” In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., held that Title VII recognized discrimination claims based on facially neutral policies that were not motivated by discrimination but had a disparate impact when applied. Until 1993, based on the Griggs decision, the federal courts of appeal uniformly interpreted the ADEA as authorizing recovery on a disparate impact theory.
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