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When a landowner contends that government action has effected a taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, where can she sue? Until this past June, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (June 2019), the answer was clear: state court and only state court. Knick changed all that. The Court overruled Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172 and held that a landowner who claimed to have suffered a taking at the hands of state or local officials could seek redress in federal court without the need to first seek compensation through state proceedings. The Court's holding may channel more takings cases into federal courts, but leaves those courts with some unresolved questions.
In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee developer's taking claim in federal district court was unripe for two reasons: First, the developer had not obtained a final decision on its application for a new residential subdivision, and second, the developer had not used the relevant state procedures for obtaining just compensation. In defending the second ripeness requirement, the Court emphasized that "[t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation." As a result, the Court concluded that so long as the state provides a procedure for a landowner to obtain just compensation, the landowner cannot proceed to federal court until she has used that procedure and been denied compensation. Subsequently, in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, the Court made it clear that a landowner who raised the takings claim in state court would instead be precluded from subsequently raising the same claim in federal court by operation of the federal full faith and credit statute. As a consequence, the Court effectively barred taking claims from federal court. Williamson County and San Remo generated concern from those who contended that, by limiting takings plaintiffs' access to federal courts, the Court had relegated takings protection into the status of a second-class constitutional right.
Rose Knick's 90-acre Pennsylvania parcel included a small family cemetery. The township enacted an ordinance requiring that cemeteries be open to the public during the day. Knick contended that the ordinance constituted a taking. When state court declined to rule on her request for declaratory and injunctive relief because the township was not seeking to enforce the ordinance against her, Knick proceeded to federal court. The federal district court dismissed her claim as unripe, citing Williamson County, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of five to four. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, noted that Williamson County's finality requirement "is not at issue here," but concluded that the state-litigation requirement "relegates the Takings Clause 'to the status of a poor relation' among the provisions of the Bill of Rights." By overruling that requirement, the Court claimed to be "restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned."
The Court rejected the contention underlying the Williamson County state-litigation requirement that no constitutional violation occurs until the state actually denies compensation. Instead, the Court held: "If a local government takes private property without paying for it, that government has violated the Fifth Amendment — just as the Takings Clause says — without regard to subsequent state court proceedings." As a result, an aggrieved landowner can bring the takings claim in federal court at the moment of the alleged taking, regardless of any post-taking remedies the state might make available.
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