Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
On Nov. 1, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission to address a question that, until fairly recently, seemed clear beyond cavil: whether the SEC has authority to obtain disgorgement in civil actions to enforce the federal securities laws. Since the 1970's, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains has been a powerful and frequently utilized weapon in the SEC's arsenal. In its June 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), the Supreme Court characterized SEC disgorgement as a "penalty" rather than an equitable remedy but expressly declined to decide whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings. In Liu, the Court will address head-on the question left open in Kokesh. The outcome of Liu has the potential to upset long-standing precedent and practices. If the Court further restricts the SEC's ability to obtain disgorgement, the decision will have significant ramifications for the SEC's enforcement program.
No statute expressly authorizes courts to award disgorgement to the SEC in civil enforcement actions. Rather, by statute, the SEC in district court proceedings may obtain only injunctions, civil monetary penalties, bars and suspensions from certain types of employment in the securities industry, and equitable relief. See, 15 U.S.C. §§77t; 78u(d). Nevertheless, for decades the SEC routinely has sought — and courts have granted — disgorgement as a component of equitable relief.
The SEC's disgorgement authority began as a judicially-implied remedy to fill a statutory gap. As originally enacted in the 1930s, federal securities laws authorized the SEC to obtain injunctive relief but did not authorize the SEC to obtain any monetary relief. Beginning with the Texas Gulf Sulfur case in 1970, the SEC successfully persuaded courts to order so-called "equitable" monetary relief as an exercise of their "inherent equity power to grant relief ancillary to an injunction" in order to "effectuate the purpose" of the Exchange Act. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 446 F. 2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?