Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the appropriate remedy for the prior discriminatory application of U.S. Trustee quarterly fees in Chapter 11 cases. See, Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, 144 S. Ct. 1588 (2024). In its ruling, the Court held that the government was not required to refund millions of dollars paid by a Chapter 11 debtor pursuant to an unconstitutional fee scheme between the judicial districts. Citing congressional intent, the Court determined that "prospective relief" was the only remedy necessary to resolve the "short lived" and "small" constitutional violation found in Siegel. See, Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 596 U.S. 464 (2022).
In most judicial districts, Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases are administered through the U.S. Trustee program, a program within the Department of Justice. Created by Congress, the U.S. Trustee program was designed to be self-funded by fees paid by debtors so that the taxpayers are not burdened. In the remaining jurisdictions, Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases are administered through the bankruptcy administrator program, which is run by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. This program is largely funded by Congress through its general appropriation powers and is supplemented by debtor fees.
In 2017, Congress substantially increased the fees imposed on Chapter 11 debtors (for both newly filed and pending cases) in districts administered by the U.S. Trustee program when it faced a shortfall in funding. The increase in fees took effect in January 2018. However, the fees for debtors in districts administered by the bankruptcy administrator program were not similarly increased until October 2018 for newly filed debtors and 2021 for already pending debtors. This gap in time in implementing the increased fees led to a large disparity between the amount of fees paid under each program. Following a constitutional challenge of this fee disparity, the U.S. Supreme Court in Siegel v. Fitzgerald ruled that the fee disparity resulting from the programs' different fee structure violated the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution, which requires that bankruptcy laws be "uniform." Though the Supreme Court held that the nonuniformity of the statutes was unconstitutional, it did not identify an appropriate remedy.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
Ideally, the objective of defining the role and responsibilities of Practice Group Leaders should be to establish just enough structure and accountability within their respective practice group to maximize the economic potential of the firm, while institutionalizing the principles of leadership and teamwork.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?